Given the vast historiography concerning the performance of British forces in the campaign in Northwest Europe from the Normandy landings to March 1945, it may be wondered whether further analysis is warranted. Historian Louis Devine,[1] however, believes he has found a new and better perspective on the British "way of war" in this theater of World War II.

The author concentrates on the 43rd (Wessex) and 53rd (Welsh) Divisions as representative of the British contribution to Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's 21st Army Group. Forty-third was "an untried 'average' division," a Territorial formation founded in 1908 and deployed throughout the First World War. It had seen no combat during the Second World War before D-Day, having spent the war training in Kent. There was nothing special about it with regard to combat experience, weapons, or training (39–40). The experience of 53rd was very similar, though one of its brigades fought in Flanders in May 1940 (83–84). That the commanders of these divisions retained their positions throughout the campaign of 1944–45 suggests their performance met with Montgomery's approval, especially, given the rapid turnover among other commanders; hence they may be taken as representative exponents of the army's accepted "way of war" (83).

The introduction summarizes Devine's conceptual methodology, gives an overview of the relevant scholarship, and characterizes the typical British infantry division of the period. Chapter 1 provides context with a conventional account of the advanced state of development of the British Army in 1918, its stagnation owing to political and financial factors during the interwar period, and the painful lessons it had to learn in the early years of the Second World War. There is also a sound discussion of the development of doctrine and training, based on the work of David French.[2]

Chapters 2–8, the core of the book, alternate between the two selected divisions. Devine stays true to his promise to write "history from below," focusing on each formation's various engagements, large and small, through the crossing of the Rhine in March 1945, when the German defenses crumbled and the war took on a new character. The following is typical of the detailed analyses of operations, based on war diaries written by the various units and formations:

Each chapter ends with a convenient summary of the key points in its narrative.

The book's conclusion pulls together its main themes, focusing on casualty avoidance and Montgomery's strategy of creating "colossal cracks" in the German defenses, as well as artillery and armor. Devine maintains that the evidence contradicts the orthodox argument stressing efforts to conserve Britain's dwindling supply of infantry through careful planning, detailed rehearsals, and ample artillery and armored support. Although planning was often elaborate and preoccupied commanders, its benefits were limited by the need to make frequent changes in reaction to evolving situations. Similarly, the infantry's increasing reliance on heavy and timely artillery support was a response to deficiencies in armor and anti-tank support rather than a way to reduce casualties. Devine cites many instances of divisional commanders aggressively driving their troops forward, sometimes for little benefit, despite the consequent heavy losses they suffered (175–82).

Despite Devine's clear argumentation and close reading of many pertinent war diaries and personal accounts, his approach has significant weaknesses. Though the idea of a longitudinal study has much to commend it, including avoiding the risk of overemphasizing set-piece battles as if they were the norm, much of his argument depends on whether two "average" infantry divisions can be considered representative of the entire British Army in a specific campaign. Britain contributed three armored divisions to 21st Army Group, along with expert infantry such as the 1st and 6th (Airborne) Divisions and the 51st (Highland) Division. Incorporating into his analysis one division from each of these categories would have enabled the author to compare them with his selected "average" units.

Devine assumes a readership with significant prior knowledge. He describes neither the specific forces of the 21st Army Group as a whole nor their operations during the campaign, thereby depriving his discussion of 43rd and 53rd Divisions of much-needed context. Dates of operations are often omitted until deep into the narrative, and the provided maps (all from previous publications) are never referred to. Conversely, he sometimes explains details likely to be familiar to most readers, such as what an "O Group" was (58), or makes outright errors, such as referring to the "CO" of a platoon or to "Operation Garden" as "the accompanying ground advance to Operation Market Garden" (82).

Louis Devine has written an interesting and salutary longitudinal account of two "average" British infantry divisions during the campaign in Northwest Europe. But, though he opens a valuable new perspective and fills gaps in the existing historiography, he ultimately fails to make a convincing case that his analysis of two rather untypical divisions proves that the existing picture of the "British way of war" is incorrect.