Bruce Zellers
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Review of Bruce
Cumings, The Korean War: A History. New York: Modern
Library, 2010. Pp. xix, 288. ISBN 978-0-679-64357-9.
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The title of Bruce Cumings' new book may mislead unwary buyers into
expecting an extended, detailed narrative of American combat
actions. But to learn how the 5th Marines or the 8th Calvary fought
on 27 November 1950, one must look elsewhere.[1]
Cumings
(University of Chicago) focuses instead on the war among the
Koreans—Korea's war, if you will. A set of numbers reveals his
priorities: U.S. wartime casualties were 130,000; Korean losses
totaled 3.3 million (35). Cumings argues that the Korean War was a
tragic chapter in a much longer struggle that began with resistance
to Japanese colonization early in the twentieth century and evolved
into a civil war following the division of the peninsula in 1945. He
reminds us that the central event in 1950 was an "invasion" of Korea
by Koreans. He sharply criticizes many aspects of the American role
in the conflict, which he sees as often misguided and occasionally
brutal. Sadly, in his view, virtually the whole war long ago slid
from the American consciousness—at some continuing cost to the nation.
The book reflects not only the author's intellectual odyssey through
a wide range of primary sources, but also his philosophical
reflections on them.[2]
Cumings opens with a streamlined narrative of the war years
(1950-53) as an introduction to his principal themes. He tells the
story this way: North Korea invaded the South in June 1950 after a
lengthy period of border skirmishes initiated by both North and
South. The decision to attack reflected a desire to reunify the
nation and "rectify… ancient inequities" dating to the Japanese
colonial era (4); the Soviets and the Chinese supported these goals,
but did not provoke hostilities. The American decision to counter
the northern offensive with force marked the ascendancy of Dean
Acheson and Washington's strategy of military containment. The
decision for a counter invasion of the North in the fall of 1950
represented "logical follow-on to the earlier move" (22). The
Chinese chose to intervene to protect their frontiers and honor the
"sacrifices" Koreans made on China's behalf during World War II and
the Civil War (24-25). Combined Chinese and North Korean forces
enjoyed several dramatic successes, but not overall victory.
During the last and longest phase of the war, fighting raged over
the entire peninsula: along a stationary front approximating the
38th parallel, against guerrilla bands in rural areas, in POW camps,
and in the air. Nearly every day American bombers advanced the
policy goal of making North Korea a vast "wasteland" (29). Despite
the willingness of Koreans to fight on when the United States,
China, and the Soviet Union had tired of the struggle, hostilities
ended with the armistice of July 1953. Cumings maintains the war
entrenched the notion of militarized containment in Washington; in
Korea "the tragedy was that the war solved nothing": Korea remained
(and remains) divided, and a technical state of war continues (35).
In Cumings' view, "Korea surely suffered one of the worst
20th-century histories" (235). How did Koreans get into such a
tragic mess? Before 1950, they had suffered almost half a century
of humiliation, bitter internal divisions, and intense physical
hardship. Early in the twentieth century, Korea, an ancient nation,
fell victim to its more powerful neighbor, Japan. Theodore Roosevelt
gave his tacit blessing to Japan's treatment of Korea as a prize
after its victory in the Russo-Japanese war of 1905. Though the
Japanese occupation was brutal, some Koreans, especially among the
land-owning elite, allied with the colonizers. National sentiment
and a sense of economic injustice fueled resistance movements,
especially in the South. Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931
further complicated the situation, as men like the future North
Korean leader Kim Il Sung joined the Chinese struggle against
Japan. This "pitiless and unforgiving struggle" (237) shaped a cadre
of intensely anti-Japanese and nationalist Korean leaders. Marxism
was their language, and the Chinese their grateful allies and
patrons. The outbreak of World War II exacerbated matters as
the Japanese stepped up their exploitation. Tens of thousands of
Koreans were forced to work for Japan or serve in its armed forces.[3]
Thousands of
Korean women were forced into prostitution as "comfort women" for
Japanese soldiers. Korean antagonism toward all things Japanese was
profound. The defeat of Japan revived dreams of national
independence and a longing to settle scores with Japan's
collaborators inside Korea.
Then, in Cumings' view, the United States made matters worse. Eager
to block Soviet advances and revive Japan's economy as the engine of
the region, American policy makers imposed an arbitrary division on
Koreans and then installed a southern government staffed largely by
collaborators with Japan. The United States became a surrogate--and
advocate—for Japan; the collaborators (especially strong in the
police and the army) remained the same. To head the new government,
the United States brought in
Syngman Rhee, an authoritarian nationalist with a vision of
reuniting his country and, to that end, blithely willing to do
business with Japan's Korean collaborators. Americans tried to rein in his aspirations. Kim Il Sung,
aided by those who had fought the Japanese and later for a Communist
victory in China, was established in North Korea; he and his
supporters saw themselves as the authentic voice of Korean
nationalism. Widespread uprisings against elite domination and
foreign collaboration after 1945 were brutally suppressed by South
Korean regular and irregular forces, using tactics devised by the
Japanese. Americans sometimes looked on or even participated in the
mayhem, their attitudes colored by anti-communism, respect for the
Japanese (and hopes for their economic revival), and an "ingrained
prejudice" against Koreans as a race of "barbarians" (14, 16). To
Northerners who had fought Japan on their own soil and in China, it
was déjà vu: new faces, same old colonialism. As Korean troops were
released from the Chinese revolutionary armies, Kim envisioned a
military solution to the "new" occupation. During the ensuing war,
these antagonisms led to massacres, as both sides wreaked vengeance
on the other; Rhee's men were often especially brutal. All of this
was visible at the time and reported by the press outside the United
States. Three decades of American-supported military dictators and
civilian tyrants followed in the South (211) and, of course, the
heirs of Kim Il Sung remained in power in the North.
The consequences, acknowledged and unacknowledged, of these events
in Korea are one of Cumings' major concerns. The division of Korea
continues and the threat of a horrific renewal of fighting remains
substantial. While South Korea has recently emerged as a democratic
state, North Korea remains in the grip of a xenophobic leadership
cadre. This is part of a larger problem: the unfinished process of
national unification. Many Americans see the current situation as
something of a victory. As British historian Max Hastings has aptly
put it, the war "saved the southerners from a tragic fate, and
indeed opened the way to a future for them infinitely better than
anything attainable under Kim Il Sung…. [I]t still seems a struggle
that the West was right to fight" (427). For Cumings, on the other
hand, the events of 1950-53 aborted "what might have been an ending
for Koreans" (146)--freed from outside interference and with ancient
quarrels put to rest, Korea might at last find its "place in the
sun," to quote the title of Cumings earlier history of Korea.[4]
That prospect, however, seems distant. Instead, Cumings supports
efforts aimed at healing through remembering. He reports on South
Korea's attempts, based on the experience of nations such as South
Africa, "to find ways to acknowledge past crimes, to grasp how they
happened, and to reconcile with the victims" (235). The Korean Truth
and Reconciliation Commission (est. 2005) has begun to look into
atrocities on all sides and hopes to lay ghosts to rest.[5]
Much of Cumings' information on the internal war comes from this
Commission and its supporters. He also hope Americans will benefit
from truth telling, that veterans like Art Hunter, who participated
in the massacre at Nogun-ri (1950), might gain peace by honestly
looking at events (166-67). He believes, too, that reawakened
memories of lost opportunities in Korea may further understanding of
later tragedies in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan—and prevent future
disasters. His book is meant to help reduce the "unfathomable
cluelessness" (241) that has so often led the United States into
trouble in The American Century.
The restorative truths told by the survivors and living victims of
the Korean conflict are fruits of the popular struggle for democracy
in Korea; this surge of civil society is also a surge of suppressed
information, and would never have been possible during the long
decades of [South Korean] dictatorship…. Thus, in the past twenty
years Koreans have produced hundreds of histories, memories, oral
accounts, documentaries, and novels that trace back to the years
immediately after liberation [from Japan]…. The personal truths of
the victims and survivors should become a restorative truth, a
requiem for the “forgotten war” that might finally achieve the
peaceful reconciliation that the two Koreas have been denied since
Dean Rusk first etched a line at the 38th parallel in August 1945
(203).
Cumings assumes a unified Korea would look more like present-day
Vietnam or China than North Korea: nationalism and the desire for
prosperity would trump ideology. Perhaps it would have played out
that way without American and UN intervention. The book certainly
sheds light on the ongoing diplomatic imbroglio in that region and
the argument for the benefits of truth and reconciliation certainly
resonates around the world. Cumings may be unrealistic in expecting
Americans to become more sensitive to the histories and cultures of
other peoples, but his book will richly reward those willing to be
challenged by a novel perspective on the causes and consequences of
the Korean War.
Greenhills School and
Oakland University
zellers@greenhillsschool.org
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[1] E.g., to Max Hastings, The Korean War
(NY: Simon & Schuster, 1987) or David Halberstam, The Coldest
Winter: America and the Korean War (NY: Hyperion, 2007). To
know what 27 November felt like on the ground, see Donald Knox,
The Korean War: An Oral History, 2 vols. (San Diego:
Harcourt, 1985/1988).
[2] One does not often encounter Friedrich
Nietzsche, Ambrose Bierce, or the word "mnemonic" in histories
of the war in Korea.
[3] In 1943, e.g., more than a thousand Korean
laborers died in far off Tarawa during fighting between U.S.
Marines and Japanese forces: see Audrey McAvoy (AP), "Search Is
On for Remains of WWII Marines," Detroit Free Press (28
Aug 2010) <link>.
[4] Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History,
rev. ed. (NY: Norton, 2005).
[5] The Commission maintains a website <link>.
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