
William B. Boardman |
Review of Niall J.A. Barr, Pendulum of War:
The Three Battles of El Alamein. Woodstock, NY: Overlook
Press, 2005. Pp. xliii, 531. ISBN 978-1-58567-655-2. |
In his introduction to Pendulum of War,
Barr offers a clear synopsis of the British Eighth Army's operations
at El Alamein from June to November 1942. He stresses the importance
of the campaign as both a contemporary event and a part of the
post-war mythology that resulted from Winston Churchill's and especially
Bernard Montgomery's trumpeting of the victory's importance and their place
in it. While few deny El Alamein was a turning point, early critics
of Montgomery like Desmond Young noted that "The general impression
... seems to be that [the Eighth Army] remained cowed and cowering
at El Alamein ... [until] General Montgomery arrived out of the
skies and ... at once turned defeat into victory. The legend is
unfair to the Eighth Army: it is also contrary to the facts"
(xxxviii). Barr seeks to address this problem by analyzing "the full
range of developments which took the Eighth Army from defeat to
victory" (xliii).
Barr's first two chapters are an excellent
summary of the war in North Africa from its beginning to the
Panzerarmee's first attacks at El Alamein on 1 July. Especially
noteworthy is his analysis of the position of Commander-in-Chief
Middle East. First held by Archibald Wavell, then by Claude Auchinleck, the command
encompassed a huge geographical area from Rhodesia to Iran and
involved many difficult strategic issues, including the looming
threat of Axis forces in North Africa, Italians in East Africa,
Vichy forces in Syria and Lebanon, an uprising in Iraq, and the
possibility of a German drive through the Caucasus into Iran and
Iraq. When Auchinleck took direct command of Eighth Army on 25 June
following the battle of Mersa Matruh, he was still the theater
commander as well. Although this dual command gave him full
knowledge of theater-wide strategic concerns, it also diluted his
and his staff's effectiveness.
The supply situation facing both sides in the
Desert War recurs throughout Barr's narrative. Although the Axis
routes were far shorter, they were under constant pressure from
British forces based at Malta and Egypt. The British supply chain
was extraordinarily long--ships took up to seventeen weeks to reach
Suez for offloading--but was generally much safer. Barr also picks
up on a point often overlooked: the British had the advantage of a
supply and industrial base in the Middle East that pre-dated the
war. Locally made supplies and food supplemented material brought by
convoys, while repair depots around Cairo provided the Eighth Army
with a logistical asset that Axis forces could not match.
Barr also addresses the intelligence available to
both sides leading up to El Alamein. He sees German access to
American diplomatic codes (coupled with tactical intelligence
provided by Kompanie 621) as critical to Rommel's success prior to
El Alamein. When the American "Good Source" was lost on 29 June,
Rommel was deprived of his strategic eyes and, when Kompanie 621 was
captured, virtually all of his operational and tactical intelligence
capability vanished. On the other hand, British intelligence grew in
quantity and value. Ultra summaries disclosed the operational status
of Axis units and a general picture of Axis plans, permitting the
British to stand units up or down and redeploy formations to meet
possible operational threats. The limitations of Ultra restricted
its tactical uses to very narrow applications like the interception
of fuel tankers. The British continued to improve tactical and
operational intelligence throughout the campaign, especially through
ground observers and reconnaissance by the Desert Air Force. In
addition, the British "J" service, implemented during the July
battles, listened in on friendly communications and facilitated a
better picture of allied dispositions and much faster tactical
responses than did Ultra and "Y" service intelligence or aerial
reconnaissance filtering down from higher echelons.
Barr argues that the July battles show the Eighth
Army, despite its pounding at Gazala and Mersa Matruh, remained a
cohesive force willing and able to fight a series of defensive
battles and counterattacks throughout the month. The fighting in the
first days of July, "vindicated Auchinleck's new policy of mobile
brigade groups" (87). He saw the need for rapid movement in desert
warfare and turned away from the previous practice of deploying
infantry in unsupported "boxes." Units unable to transport their
troops were sent to the rear and artillery fire control was
centralized. Auchinleck's brigade groups had become an all-arms
force of armor, mobile infantry, and artillery--a seemingly
effective counter to the Panzerarmee. Even Rommel noted that
Auchinleck "was handling his forces with very considerable skill and
tactically better than Ritchie had done" (87). Nevertheless, the new
style of fighting had its problems. Auchinleck's corps and
divisional commanders did not like the idea of brigade groups and
caused him plenty of frustration as he cajoled them into following
orders. To make matters worse, Auchinleck never seemed to use the
Eighth Army as an integrated whole. Instead, the British
counterattacks mounted in July were invariably piecemeal. Though the
stated goal was the destruction of the Panzerarmee, Auchinleck
seemed unable to coordinate the army's corps, much less its brigade
groups, for a decisive blow. He did, however, recognize the Italian
infantry component of the Panzerarmee as its weakest link and struck
it at every opportunity.
Auchinleck also faced an unusual situation in
that the Eighth Army was a multi-national force comprised of
British, Dominion, and Indian Army units, each under its own rules
of order and discipline. Dominion forces (Australian, New Zealand,
and South African) could even trump the army commander's orders by
threatening to require approval from their home governments. In
addition, Dominion and Indian Army officers could not be replaced
nor their units broken up or consolidated under other commands.
Although Auchinleck's counterattacks in July
failed to break the Panzerarmee, Barr contends the Eighth Army
learned valuable lessons from those engagements. He stands firmly on
Auchinleck's side in the "Auk vs. Monty" debates. Simply stated, the
foundations for the Eighth Army's renewal and later successes had
been laid by Auchinleck and were not the result of sweeping changes
by Montgomery. During the crucial early August pause in action, an
army mine clearance school was established, night movements were
practiced, artillery coordination was tightened, communication links
between units were improved, and the necessity of mutually
supporting units and coordinated attacks was instilled. In addition,
new units were acclimated to the theater and critical equipment like
anti-tank guns and tanks upgraded and their crews retrained--a
luxury not available previously due to constant fighting. As
anti-tank units were upgraded, the now obsolete 2lb anti-tank guns
were doled out to the infantry battalions to provide some measure of
defense. The importance of training, even for veterans, was
recognized and units were rotated out of the line for exercises. The
Eighth Army was also redeployed, as Auchinleck and Dorman-Smith
prepared for Rommel's next offensive and planned their own: some
units formed defensive positions in depth and along key terrain
features like Ruweisat Ridge and Alam el Halfa Ridge, while others
were deployed for counterattack.
Thus, the army Montgomery inherited in mid-August
had already turned a corner and absorbed the hard lessons of July.
Barr argues that when Rommel launched his final attempt to crack the
British at Alam el Halfa on 30 August, it was Auchinleck's Eighth
Army and defensive plan that stopped the Germans, not any major
effort on Montgomery's part. He even maintains that Monty's
de-mobilizing of the infantry made it difficult to destroy the
Panzerarmee once it had been stopped. The British armor commanders
were reluctant to attack the German gun line without infantry
support, squandering the chance of an immediate counterattack on the
immobile Panzerarmee. Rommel managed to withdraw, and a six-week
stalemate ensued.
While Barr is rightly critical of Montgomery for
taking so much of the glory for Alam el Halfa and the final battles
of October and November, he does credit him with the change in
command style and nonchalant confidence that immediately impressed
his officers and troops. Where Auchinleck and Dorman-Smith had
failed to communicate with their commanders and staffs effectively,
Montgomery was careful to make his corps and divisional commanders
fully aware of the others' plans as well as his own goals. He gave the
corps commanders nearly complete freedom to develop their own plans
once he had issued operational orders, unlike Auchinleck, who was
often far too involved tactically. The discipline Montgomery and de
Guingand brought to the staff work was invaluable to the Eighth
Army. Closer work with the Desert Air Force was another hallmark of
Montgomery's command. Though Barr constantly stresses the importance
of the DAF to the Eighth Army in battle, their close cooperation
reached new heights under Montgomery's leadership.
Despite such improvements, Barr sees Montgomery
returning to the past in planning Operation Lightfoot, that is, to
the British way of war in World War I. He dispensed with mobile
brigade groups and returned to set-piece battles: there would be
frontal infantry attacks with overwhelming artillery support on a
narrow frontage to breach the Axis line and allow a corps de
chasse of armor to move into the enemy rear. For officers who
had come of age in the Great War, it was a very familiar tactic. The
superb state of training and planning paid off during the first day
of Lightfoot, as the infantry divisions performed to very high
standards and made relatively smooth advances through deep
minefields at night--a far cry from the July battles. By the third
day, the infantry "break in" was complete, but there would be no
breakout because the defenses were deeper than expected and
casualties far heavier. Lightfoot had stalled. A push north to the
coast to cut off Axis forces in a salient forced Rommel to throw in
his final reserves. Only then was Operation Supercharge launched in
a final attempt to break the Axis line. Fighting devolved into
piecemeal infantry attacks and unsupported frontal assaults by armor
against gun lines reminiscent of the July battles. Technically,
Supercharge too failed because the line was still not breached.
Nevertheless, the grinding battle of 2 November shattered the
Panzerarmee and Rommel ordered its withdrawal. Monty and Churchill
had their victory, but at a frightful cost.
The Eighth Army at El Alamein had truly
transformed itself "from a clumsy and inept fighting formation into
an effective and battle-winning army" (412). I fully agree with
Barr's assessment "that the three battles of El Alamein cannot be
seen as separate and distinct events but ... as an important
continuous experience in the development of the Eighth Army" and
that it "learned more from its defeats than the Panzerarmee ever
learned from its victories" (409). I highly recommend Pendulum of
War to anyone interested in the Desert War.
Eastern Michigan University
wbboardman@gmail.com |