
Matt J. Schumann |
Review of Walter R. Borneman, The French and
Indian War: Deciding the Fate of North America. New York:
Harper-Collins, 2007. Pp. xxiii, 360. ISBN 978-0-06-076184-4. |
For the casual reader interested in a lively
introduction to the French and Indian War, this is an excellent
book. It surpasses most general histories by its consideration of
the long European and global background to the conflict, its
handling of theaters well outside North America--such as the
Philippines! (271-2), and its attention to details that other, even
prominent scholars, sometimes overlook. This said, it may be
recommended as a general introduction only; readers in whom it
inspires a stronger interest in the war would be well-advised to
consult the spate of more detailed scholarly accounts in the
newly-vibrant historiography on the subject.[1]
A pervasive feature of his book is Borneman's
dedication of small sections to more obscure aspects of the war,
some of which, while intriguing in themselves, are only tangential
to his larger narratives. These include Céloron de Blainville's
mission south of the Great Lakes in 1749 (14-7) and Admiral Edward
Boscawen's adventures in the North Atlantic six years later (44-6).
His commentary on Wolfe's legacy--on Pitt's speech to Parliament and
the rhymes in British Canada (224)--is no less engaging, and his
surprising attention to the naval battle near Port Mahon (63-6) is
admirable for moving beyond the American backwoods to the European
theater. Far from distracting, these small digressions add breadth
and substance to an already vivid narrative.
More generally, Borneman is to be commended for
offering a fairly detailed background for many of the major actors
on the British side, not least Benjamin Franklin and William Pitt
(30-1, 70-1). His use of foreshadowing is also judicious, not least
in his short discussion of three of Braddock's adjutants at the
Monongahela--George Washington, Thomas Gage, and Horatio Gates
(58-9)--and the end of Jeffrey Amherst's career in 1763 (294-5). The final
chapter as well (296-308) brings the coming Revolution into focus,
though it was far from certain in 1763. Thus he makes good on the
last comments in his introduction:
Land claims west of the Appalachians and taxes imposed without
representation quickly rankled colonists no longer bound to the
British crown by the fear of French encirclement. Revolution was
premature, but the die had been cast. The triumphs of one war had
sown the seeds of discontent that would lead to another. Great
Britain had indeed won a continent, but in doing so, it had also lit
the fuse of revolution (xxiii).
Thus, throughout his book, Borneman provides
context for and foreshadowing of the American War of Independence,
so crucial to scholarship on the Seven Years' War in general and to
its niche in the American imagination and in the American academic
market.
Alongside this anticipation of the Revolution,
however, Borneman also keeps his readers squarely in the "present"
of the 1750s and early 1760s, with gripping, meticulous accounts of
some of the most important campaigns. His opening, on Braddock's
1755 expedition (46-58), is typical of the whole work and worthy of
emulation for its fascinating and detailed narrative. In the same
vein is the story of John Forbes' 1758 expedition to Fort Duquesne
(152-68). Borneman's consistent inclusion of operations outside the
American theater, for example in the Caribbean (169-86), sets him
apart from most scholars of the French and Indian War.
A relatively short notes section at the end
completes the catalogue of the book's merits. Borneman has drawn on
everything from the latest standard works on the war (see note 1
above) to textbooks and a variety of printed primary documents. He
thus taps a vital and growing academic historiography on the war and
hints at the ever-expanding accessibility of printed primary
sources. Without an exaggerated effort to impress readers by
parading his research, he enriches a brisk narrative with occasional
footnotes to assist readers seeking deeper explorations.
In this last regard, however, especially for
those seeking a more academic type of history, Borneman's book shows
its limitations. One of its notable qualities is a bias in favor of
Anglo-America and the Elder Pitt. This certainly follows the
previous historiography, yet a fuller appreciation of French motives
would have added greater richness to the narrative.[2]
Borneman might also have noted the great inconvenience of French
traders forced to reach the Mississippi by way of Lake Michigan, for
example, as well as the danger that British traders, having blocked
routes to New Orleans by way of the Allegheny, the Great Miami, and
ultimately the Ohio River, might establish one more trading post on
the Mississippi itself and so prevent communication altogether
between Louisiana and Canada. Conversely, Thomas Pelham-Holles,
First Duke of Newcastle, stands condemned as foolish and
nearsighted, sometimes repeatedly in a short space of text (42-4),
though recent (and not-so-recent) scholarship shows him to have been
generally competent and well liked by colleagues.[3]
Finally, the Britain-versus-France paradigm outlined in the
introduction fails to take note of the complexities in European
international relations--complexities that found Britain and France
allied in the War of the Quadruple Alliance (1718-22) and generally
on good terms overall so long as Robert Walpole and Cardinal Fleury
held their respective posts (i.e., up to 1742-43).
It is also worth noting that, while Borneman has
a solid command of what happened, he is less at home in his
discussions of why. Thus, he posits a certain inevitability about
Anglo-French rivalry and the War of Independence, noting for example
British hesitation over French breaches of trust in the Caribbean
(170), but omitting Britain's bad faith toward Spain over the trade
in logwood from present-day Belize. Conversely, there is no mention
of the British non-reaction (even among other colonies!) to the
destruction of Pickawillany in 1752, or of a treaty signed between
the two East India Companies in 1755. Likewise, George III receives
due criticism for his "sophomoric prattle" toward Lady Sarah Lennox,
but not for his handling of what was, at the start of his reign, one
of the most effective ministries in British history (264); and John
Burgoyne receives almost as much attention for his activities yet to
come at Saratoga as for his leadership in Portugal (265). No reasons
are given, however, for either appointment.
In sum, this book ranks among the most appealing
available introductions to the Seven Years' War, and particularly its
American theater. It is well written, sufficiently detailed, and
well researched throughout. Another attraction is Borneman's success
in evoking the romance of the Anglo-French rivalry and the
excitement of the coming Revolution. These last are excellent
selling points for the book, but they do a disservice to scholarship
more narrowly focused on the war itself, some of which appears in
the notes and bibliography. Indeed, Borneman's underuse of such
sources is a telling indicator of how far short he falls of a
nuanced academic history. Thus, while readers seeking a good
beginning study of the war are encouraged to start with this book,
those desiring more penetrating and comprehensive analysis will need
to look much, much further into the current relevant literature.
Eastern Michigan University
mschuman@emich.edu
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