The title of Adrian Lewis's book suggests that it
is rather narrowly focused on the development of American military
power in the latter half of the twentieth century. However, it
becomes clear that his study is not another institutional and
operational history of the American military, but rather a broader
examination of the intellectual and cultural system of the armed
forces of the United States since World War II. Lewis states clearly
in his introduction that he intends to explain not only how
Americans have fought wars but also why they have fought them as
they have (xvii).
Professor Lewis, chair of the history department
at the University of North Texas and a retired Army major, has
already established himself as an important military historian. His
previous monograph, Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory,[1]
provided an intriguing, albeit critical, evaluation of the American
landings during the Normandy invasion. The American Culture of War
continues to mark him as an innovative thinker and to show military
historians how their work can be informed by fields like
anthropology and political science.
The book is primarily a synthesis, understandable
given that the author covers over sixty years of history and a wide
range of topics and subjects. He does include a moderate primary
source base made up primarily of official histories prepared by each
of the military branches as well as operational and doctrinal
guides. The book covers the period from World War II through the
current war in Iraq in chronological order. Each chapter is devoted
either to establishing how American cultural concepts of war changed
or to a specific operational history that demonstrates how such
changes affected military practice. Arguably the most important
chapters are the first two, "Culture, Genes, and War" and "Traditional American Thinking about the Conduct of War," in which
Lewis provides the theoretical framework for his argument about
culture. One of the great tasks that a historian faces in making
claims about cultural norms is to clearly define what is meant by
culture. The numerous debates of historians and anthropologists over
how best to define the term raise the peculiar problem of too many
classifications. The author states that his intent is not to forge
his own definition but rather to choose the most appropriate one for
his work (2).[2]
Lewis's target audience is a fairly broad one, including historians,
anthropologists, political scientists, and military professionals.
The latter or, more narrowly, the civilian decision makers within
the military structure, are his primary audience.
Lewis argues that since the end of World War II
American cultural thinking about warfare has changed to the
detriment of the nation-state. The greatest change has occurred in
what Lewis deems the two most important tenets of American warfare:
first, that man is not a means to an end, and second, that there
should be equality of opportunity or more precisely "equality of
sacrifice." The first tenet meant that Americans, through World War
II, were willing to become a means for the ends of the state
because, for the most part, wars were relatively short, decisive
affairs—aberrations in the normal pattern of life. American citizens
thus were willing to allow themselves to be used to fulfill the
needs of the state, but only because doing so represented an anomaly
in the course of their lives rather than the norm. Traditionally,
Lewis posits, Americans had been reluctant to allow the government
to dictate their service to the state in times of war. The second
tenet was founded on a long-held belief that all American men were
capable of serving in the military when necessary as a duty of
citizenship. However, as Lewis argues so forcefully, the wars of the
second half of the twentieth century have completely altered how
Americans think about how wars are to be fought.
In American memory World War II remains "the good
war." The citizen-soldiers of the United States had proven their
worth against the hard-edged militarism of Germany and Japan. Upon
their return home, veterans were treated as heroes and granted the
benefits of the G.I. Bill. Lewis, however, points out that World War
II also had an insidious effect on the military structure of the
United States, one that in the long run severely weakened its
ability to carry out wars as successfully as it had in previous
years. The development of the air power doctrines of World War II,
the idea that wars could be won solely through the use of strategic
bombing, gained great currency among American airmen, civilian
leaders, and the general public. The infatuation with air power, in
Lewis's estimation, stemmed from the American preference for
fighting wars with technology and overwhelming material superiority.
This formula for war removed men from the dangers of the
battlefield; this conformed to the first American cultural tenet of
war, that man is not a means to an end (62).[3]
While historians and others have long argued about the ultimate
efficacy of air power, Lewis forces the reader to consider a new and
much more worrisome question: namely, whether American emphasis on
air power has fundamentally undermined the military's ability to
achieve successful results. The author's primary concern is twofold:
first, air power doctrine has de-emphasized ground forces, which has
made Americans ever more wary of putting their soldiers in harm's
way, and second, the success of the Air Force in the public mind has
forced the Army to stress technological innovation over commitment
to the doctrines that had served it well prior to and through World
War II.
Perhaps more important than World War II in the
transformation of the American culture of war, in Lewis's
estimation, was the Korean War: "The citizen-soldier Army of the
United States would never again fight a major war with offensive
strategy and doctrine" (84). The Korean War radically altered how
American policymakers and the military thought about war. The Truman
administration entered the conflict in Korea with a limited
strategic objective, the restoration of the 38th parallel, rather
than with the mindset of a total victory, which would have meant the
forceful reunification of the Korean peninsula under a pro-Western
democratic regime. The author does admit that, in the aftermath of
MacArthur's successful landing at Inchon, the United States briefly
reverted to a total war mindset. However, the entrance of Communist
China in late 1950 again turned the war into one of limited
objectives, something nearly unheard of in American history. America
placed great emphasis on the air campaigns against the North Koreans
and Chinese and thus, according to Lewis, relegated the Army to
fighting a defensive war of attrition, something essentially opposed
to the raison d'être of the Army.
The Korean War was also important because it
altered the second great American tenet concerning war: equality of
sacrifice. The burden of the war did not fall as evenly across
American society as had that of World War II and, as Lewis points
out, the American general public quickly lost interest in a war that
had morphed into something unrecognizable to the generations who had
lived through World Wars I and II.
It was in Vietnam, though, that the final change
in the idea of equality of sacrifice occurred within the American
culture of war. Lewis does an admirable job of concisely outlining
the historiographic debate over the draft system used in Vietnam.
The main point of the draft, according to Lewis and other
historians, was not how equitable it was but rather how little it
disrupted American society (276). One of the anti-war activists'
main criticisms of the draft was that it unfairly targeted
lower-class whites and African-Americans, who suffered the brunt of
the fighting and of the casualties (275–276).[4]
Lewis points out that initially there was some truth in these
claims, especially in the case of African-Americans. For the first
time, he argues, the United States was fighting a war in which the
vast majority of Americans had little at stake. There was no
rationing, no war bond drives, no massive tax increases during the
conflict. However, the long duration of the war violated basic
precepts of Americans' cultural understanding of war. This led to an
increased animosity towards both the war and the military itself. As
a consequence, the military leadership concluded that the
traditional volunteer force that had long been a staple of American
cultural thinking about war lacked public support and was no longer
viable. Thus the military turned towards the model of a small,
professional military. This further exacerbated the conflict between
traditional attitudes about conducting war and the new realities
facing the nation by placing the burden of war on a small segment of
the American society and causing yet another division in an already
fracturing nation.
The last two chapters of the book are especially
intriguing because they cover the current war in Iraq; in some ways,
they are an exercise in historical conjecture. Lewis concedes that
the records needed to write an authoritative account of the decision
to go to war in 2003 will not be available for many years. He
presents many theories that have been put forth to explain why the
United States invaded Iraq; he himself clearly believes the war was
initiated for the wrong reasons and using the wrong methods. Many
commentators and large segments of the public see the war as
"un-American," a violation of basic principles of American conduct.
Analyzing the insurgent war in Iraq, Lewis states that "Rumsfeld's
vision of war was culturally regular" (437, my emphasis). The second
Iraq War was the culmination of a cultural evolution that had been
taking place in the American military structure since the end of
World War II. A small, highly professional force fought using
overwhelming technological and material superiority while keeping
the war for the most part isolated from American society. The Iraq
war provides Lewis with the best evidence for his argument. This is
a frightening idea and leads to an even more bothersome question: if
the current Iraq war is how the United States has come to learn to
fight wars, then can Americans actually expect to win this or any
future war? Although Lewis never poses this question directly, his
book strongly implies a negative answer.
The American Culture of War is a well argued,
well written work. Lewis skillfully guides the reader through some
relatively abstract cultural concepts and demonstrates how changes
in both actions and words have negatively affected America's ability
to prosecute wars. The book is not without flaws, but these are
minor. For example, Lewis only considers major military engagements.
It would be interesting to see how his thesis could be applied to
the American campaigns in Grenada, Nicaragua, and Panama, to name
just a few. Lewis might also have explored the role of alliance
building, a major focus of the American government and military in
the conflicts of the second half of the twentieth century. Much has
been made of the "coalition of the willing" in Iraq today. In the
first Persian Gulf War, the United States strove to build a viable
alliance that would not further upset the Middle East. In Korea and
World War II, alliance building was often at the heart of American
strategy or policy. In Vietnam, the United States fought alongside
old allies, South Korea and Australia; while their numerical support
may have been comparatively small, the pain and loss of the war were
as deeply felt in those countries as in America.[5]
Although Lewis does discuss the importance of allies in his chapters
on World War II and the Korean War, the issue deserves stronger
consideration, especially regarding its impact on the American
culture of war. Overall, however, Lewis's use of theoretical models
is a valuable addition to the study of military history; his book
will have deep resonance not just for professional historians but
for any American interested in the direction the United States may
take as the twenty-first century unfolds.
University of Tennessee
thardy@utk.edu
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[1] Chapel Hill: U North Carolina Pr, 2000.
[2] Lewis finds Pierre Bourdieu's Outline of a
Theory of Practice, trans. R. Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge U Pr,
1977; orig. 1972) best suited to his work. Bourdieu defines
culture as individuals interacting in societies using accepted
practices that have specific meanings and objectives in order to
reach culturally acceptable results. Sometimes, however, the
individual must use unacceptable practices when faced with a new
or unique situation and this leads to the development of new
accepted norms.
[3] Other works which discuss the development of
American air power include Michael S. Sherry's The Rise of
American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon (New Haven, CT:
Yale U Pr, 1987), Conrad C. Crane's Bombs, Cities, and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World
War II (Lawrence: U Pr of Kansas, 1993), and such classic works as Giulio Douhet's
Command of the
Air, trans. D. Ferrari (1942; rpt. Washington: Office of Air
Force History, 1983). An interesting study of the American love of technology and
its use as a diplomatic tool is Emily Rosenberg's Spreading the
American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945
(NY: Hill & Wang, 1982).
[4] In 1966 African-Americans made up 13% of the
Army and 8% of the Marines but suffered almost 23% of the
casualties. By the war's end, the casualty rate had dropped to
13%, mirroring the percentage of African-Americans in the American
population.
[5] One of the better works on American alliance
strategy is Mark A. Stoler's Allies and Adversaries: The Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World
War II (Chapel Hill: U North Carolina Pr, 2000). For the Australian experience in Vietnam, consult Michael
Sexton's War for the Asking: How Australia Invited Itself to
Vietnam rev. ed. (Frenchs Forest, NSW: New Holland, 2002).